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INSTRUMENTALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

LUCAS S. OSBORN*
ABSTRACT
In the last nine years, the Supreme Court has taken an increased interest in
patent law, and in each case it decided between 2002–2010, it reversed the
Federal Circuit’s patent-related decision. In addition, the Supreme Court has at
times been vocally critical of the Federal Circuit’s failure to follow Supreme
Court precedent. How has the Federal Circuit responded to this intervention?
This Article asserts that the Supreme Court’s increased attention has changed
the Federal Circuit’s rhetoric, but not its actions. While the Federal Circuit has
responded by discussing Supreme Court precedent in its recent patent
decisions, a critical analysis reveals that the Federal Circuit hyper-interprets
that precedent to appear to require the Federal Circuit’s policy-driven outcome,
when in reality the precedent is not so confining. The Federal Circuit hyperinterprets Supreme Court precedent out of a desire for certainty and relatively
outcome-determinative rules. Yet, rather than discuss its desire for certainty
and the effects of its decisions, the Federal Circuit has minimized policy
discussion. The Federal Circuit’s hyper-interpretation of precedent leads to
opinions that lack full legitimacy and its reticence toward policy discussion
increases the chances that the tests it adopts are sub-optimal.
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INTRODUCTION
“Follow our precedent!” “Don’t be so rigid!” How is a Court of Appeals
to respond to such strident directives from the Supreme Court?1 This Article
seeks to analyze how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) has responded to similar directives from the Supreme
Court. The analysis focuses on the Federal Circuit’s judicial reasoning as
embodied in its written opinions from recent important patent-related
decisions.
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with a mandate to bring
clarity and uniformity to the patent system.2 It has achieved this in part by
tending to adopt outcome-determinative tests such as bright-line rules—as
opposed to vaguer standards—wherever possible.3 Bright-line rules have
benefits. They are, for example, easy to apply and thus provide certainty and
reduce judicial discretion.4 Conversely, rules’ strengths may also be their
weaknesses—rules may encourage actors to abuse the rules’ intent by
“walking the line,” and rules may prevent judges from exercising discretion
that would lead to a “better” result.5
The literature has extensively analyzed the benefits and demerits of rules
and standards,6 the Federal Circuit’s tendency to adopt rule-oriented results,7
and the Supreme Court’s recent high reversal rate of Federal Circuit patent
decisions,8 especially where the Federal Circuit went too far in the “rules”
direction. Little scholarship, however, has analyzed the Federal Circuit’s
response to the Supreme Court’s interventions, including the process and

1. For an explanation of these exaggerations of statements from the Supreme Court, see
infra Part III.A.
2. Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (1887–1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 653–54, 659 (2001).
3. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 27 (2010) (noting that
many have observed the Federal Circuit’s formalistic tendancy); Paul Michel, Judicial
Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 762
(2004) (noting that starting in the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit’s “focus shifted toward . . . the
need for greater clarity, coherence, and predictability”); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the
Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 778–92 (2003) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
tendency to engage in rule-making formalism).
4. E.g., Thomas, supra note 3, at 776.
5. E.g., id.
6. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590–97
(1988).
7. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3, at 27; Thomas, supra note 3, at 778–92.
8. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court
as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56
UCLA L. REV. 657, 671 (2009).
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reasoning by which the Federal Circuit has adopted and justified its relatively
outcome-determinative tests in the shadow of the Supreme Court’s now
watchful eye. This Article intends to provide this analysis.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s recent high-profile patent decisions
appear to have drifted toward “forced” formalism: its written opinions seek to
justify and explain the adoption of rule-oriented tests as required by binding
Supreme Court precedent,9 whereas closer scrutiny of the allegedly confining
precedent reveals more freedom. The court writes as if the announced ruleoriented tests follow inevitably from controlling precedent,10 when in fact it
appears that policy motives, not precedent, dictate the outcomes.
Evidence of this apparent drift toward forced formalism appears in several
of the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinions issued in between 2008–2010: In re
Bilski11 (concerning the doctrine of patentable subject matter), Abbott
Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.12 (concerning the scope of “product-by-process”
patent claims), and Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.13
(concerning the written description doctrine). In each decision, the court
achieved what it regarded as a certainty-engendering result (e.g., a relatively
formalistic, rule-oriented test) and sought to justify the rule as mandated by
Supreme Court precedent.14 Yet in each case, the Supreme Court precedent,
while clearly relevant, was more nuanced and less confining than the Federal
Circuit asserted. Rather than being confined by precedent, it appears that the
Federal Circuit allowed policy considerations to determine the particular
results.
There is nothing necessarily “wrong” with allowing policy
considerations to serve as a guide to decision-making, yet one would expect
that the Federal Circuit’s opinions would make clear the relative importance of
policy versus precedent in dictating the decision. Instead, the Federal Circuit
appears to overemphasize the precedent and deemphasize the policy.
Of course, the Federal Circuit’s close attention to Supreme Court precedent
is not surprising given the Supreme Court’s recent interest in patent law and its
propensity for reversing the Federal Circuit’s decisions.15 Indeed, in the years

9. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
11. 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010). The Supreme Court affirmed the result but rejected the Federal Circuit’s test.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
12. 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court considered Section III.A.2 of the
opinion en banc. Id. at 1291.
13. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
14. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (interpreting Supreme Court cases as requiring an
exclusive machine-or-transformation test).
15. See e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 791; Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III,
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821–23 (2006); Golden,
supra note 8, at 671; Gary M. Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal
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leading up to the opinions analyzed in this Article, the Supreme Court
repeatedly reversed the Federal Circuit.16 One must search back to 2001 to
find a Supreme Court opinion completely affirming a Federal Circuit patent
opinion.17
Given the Supreme Court’s increasingly intense gaze, one would expect
the Federal Circuit to pay renewed attention to Supreme Court precedent, and
this has in fact occurred.18 But this Article analyzes whether the increased
attention to precedent has changed what the Federal Circuit is doing, or instead
only what it is writing, and draws attention to a recent tendency in the Federal
Circuit’s outcome justifications as embodied in its written opinions.
This Article analyzes the Federal Circuit’s judicial reasoning through the
lenses of formalism and instrumentalism,19 arguing that the Federal Circuit
achieved its end results (relatively formalistic, rule-oriented tests) not as a
formalist court closely following precedent, but rather as an instrumentalist
(policy-driven) court wanting to mold precedent to its purposes while
nevertheless writing in a formalistic style. Part I of this Article briefly
discusses and defines various types of formalism and instrumentalism. Part II
reviews recent high-profile Federal Circuit patent decisions to demonstrate the
court’s tendency toward forced formalism in its written opinions.
Part III discusses the reasons behind and the consequences of the Federal
Circuit’s forced formalism. While the reasons behind the trend are not entirely
clear, certainly they were catalyzed by the Supreme Court’s increased scrutiny
of patent law. Other probable factors include the Federal Circuit’s aversion to
discussing policy in its decisions, its desire either to gain affirmance from the
Supreme Court or to avoid review altogether, and the desire to force the

Circuit Patent Cases – Placing the Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining if it will
Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 239 (2010).
16. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (reversing the Federal
Circuit); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 428 (2007) (same); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 459 (2007) (same); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 137 (2007) (same); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (vacating
the Federal Circuit’s decision); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006)
(same); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) (same); Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (same); Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002) (same).
17. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001).
After this Article was submitted for publication, the Supreme Court twice completely affirmed
Federal Circuit patent decisions. See Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2199
(2011); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2252–53 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 15, at 254 (noting that the Bilski Federal Circuit
opinion “cited and analyzed virtually every Supreme Court decision relating to patentable subject
matter from O’Reilly v. Morse to Diamond v. Diehr”).
19. The terms “formalist” and “instrumentalist” as used herein are defined and clarified in
Part I.
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Supreme Court to clarify its earlier precedents. Regardless of the reasons for
it, the Federal Circuit’s forced formalism tends to lead to opinions lacking full
legitimacy and the adoption of sub-optimal legal rules.
I. THE PRESCRIPTIVE AND DECISIONAL ASPECTS OF FORMALISM AND
INSTRUMENTALISM
Students of the law quickly become familiar with two well-known
jurisprudential concepts: formalism and instrumentalism. Both terms are
subject to various definitions and sub-definitions,20 and this Article uses the
terms in limited ways.
While the two terms have other meanings, parsing both concepts reveals a
prescriptive aspect and a decisional aspect. The prescriptive aspect relates to
adjudicative decrees, and would divide along the familiar lines of those judges
and lawmakers tending to prefer clear but inflexible rules (hereinafter “rulemaking formalism”) and those favoring less clear but more flexible standards
(“standard-making instrumentalism”). Both rules and standards have familiar
benefits and drawbacks. Rules tend to be straightforward to understand and
apply, while standards involve more flexibility and interpretation. For
example, a quintessential rule is “the speed limit is 55 mph;” while the
corresponding standard is “do not drive unreasonably fast.”
Those
appreciating rule-making formalism point out, for example, that rule-making
formalism generates ex ante and ex post efficiencies in decision-making and
brings certainty to the law (e.g., drivers know how fast to drive and judges
know when accused drivers have broken the law).21 Unlike the rule-making
formalist, the standard-making instrumentalist would perhaps laud a standard’s
flexibility among other advantages.22
As commentators have observed, the Federal Circuit’s recent patent
jurisprudence leans toward rule-making formalism;23 that is, it seeks relative
certainty through rules rather than standards. Consistent with this observation,
others have called for the Federal Circuit to allow more room for policy to

20. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1687–1701 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative RuleFormalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 934 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509–10 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 6, at 568–86; Rose, supra note 6, at 590–97.
22. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 6, at 605.
23. Thomas, supra note 3, at 778–92; see also, Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2–
5 (2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit has a tendency to employ “crystal rules”); Lee, supra
note 3, at 27 (noting that the “Federal Circuit patent doctrine is highly formalistic”).
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guide its decisions,24 and the Supreme Court has not infrequently reversed the
Federal Circuit’s rule-oriented decisions in favor of a more flexible approach.25
While the difference between rules and standards is helpful to an overall
understanding of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudential approach, this Article
does not address whether one should prefer rules or standards. Instead, this
Article focuses on a second aspect of formalism and instrumentalism, the
decisional aspect.
The decisional aspect of formalism and instrumentalism refers to the
process by which a judge arrives at and justifies a conclusion. What may be
called “decisional formalism” relates to a strong adherence to stare decisis, the
treatment of precedent as strictly binding, and the rigorous application of new
facts to already stated law.26 On the other hand, what may be called
“decisional instrumentalism” relates broadly to the concept that a court should
be relatively more willing to allow policy to shape its decisions. Thus, a
decisional formalist court’s opinion would tend to discuss and apply legal
precedent meticulously; whereas the decisional instrumentalist’s opinion
would more likely focus on policy and allow it to influence whether or not to
follow binding precedent.
Therefore, this Article argues that recent Federal Circuit decisions reveal a
court tending to draft opinions as if it were engaging in decisional formalism,
while closer inspection reveals that the court is engaging in decisional
instrumentalism. Further, this “forced” decisional formalism leads to opinions
lacking full legitimacy and, if continued, could harm judicial legitimacy.
Perhaps ironically, the policy driving the Federal Circuit’s decisional
instrumentalism is often its desire for rule-oriented tests (i.e., rule-making
formalism)—that is, the court will hyper-interpret precedent to require a
desired bright-line rule. While decisional formalism would tend to emphasize
stare decisis and decisional instrumentalism would stress policy, the two are
not mutually exclusive. Where policy and precedent agree, a court could
heavily discuss both. Yet the Federal Circuit’s decisional methodology
appears to emphasize precedent and deemphasize policy even where precedent
is not inconsistent with the apparently underlying policy. The dearth of policy

24. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1671–75 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1106–10 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737
(2002) (reversing the Federal Circuit’s rule that a claim amendment serves as an absolute bar to
the doctrine of equivalents); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (reversing
the Federal Circuit’s overly “rigid” application of the teaching/suggestion/motivation test in
obviousness determinations).
26. See Pildes, supra note 20, at 607, 612–17 (identifying different types of modern legal
formalism, including decisional formalism, which is referred to therein as “rule-following”
formalism).
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discussion increases the likelihood that the court will adopt sub-optimal legal
rules because rigid rules should be carefully selected after their impact has
been fully vetted.
As evidence of the Federal Circuit’s apparent drift toward forced
formalism, this Article highlights three recent important Federal Circuit
decisions: In re Bilski,27 Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,28 and Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.29 These three decisions represent half
of the en banc decisions issued by the Federal Circuit concerning utility patents
from 2008–2010.30 Each decision’s en banc status indicates a level of
importance since, under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, “[a]n en
banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity
of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.”31 Further, because each decision is en banc, it
captures the thoughts of all participating Federal Circuit judges, as opposed to
simply a panel of three.
Moreover, each decision’s importance is likely to correlate with the
number of amicus curiae briefs filed in the en banc case.32 Under this
heuristic, Bilski was a very important decision that attracted thirty-nine
separate amicus briefs33 and Ariad was of similar importance, attracting
twenty-five34 separate amicus briefs.35 This metric fails to assist gauging the

27. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010). The Supreme Court affirmed the result but rejected the Federal Circuit’s test.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
28. 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court considered Section III.A.2 of the opinion en
banc. Id. at 1291.
29. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
30. From 2008–2010, the Federal Circuit issued six en banc opinions (or portions of
opinions) relating to utility patents. Besides Bilski, Abbott Labs, and Ariad, the Federal Circuit
also decided Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Part C.2 of the opinion decided en banc that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which prohibits export of
patented components for infringement abroad, does not apply to method claims); Princo Corp. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (concerning patent misuse);
and Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding “that 35 U.S.C. §
145 imposes no limitation on [a patent] applicant’s right to introduce new evidence before the
district court”).
31. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). Of course, under subsection 1 of the rule, an en banc decision
may simply indicate the need to secure uniformity in an area that is not of “exceptional
importance.” Id.
32. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 121
(2002) (suggesting amicus briefs may be used as a proxy for the importance of cases).
33. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 946–49 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
34. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
35. The other three Federal Circuit en banc decisions between 2008 and 2010 concerning
utility patents, see supra note 30, garnered less attention: Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1350–
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importance of the Abbott Labs decision, as the court decided the issue sua
sponte and did not provide the public with notice and opportunity to
comment.36
As decisions of relative importance, one would expect the Federal Circuit
to draft the opinions in anticipation of (or seeking to avoid) an increased
likelihood of Supreme Court review. The next Part reviews these decisions
and notes that in each decision, though in varying degrees, one can observe a
tendency toward forced decisional formalism as evidenced by the hyperinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the relatively little discussion of
policy.
II. FORCED FORMALISM AND DECISIONAL INSTRUMENTALISM AT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
This Part analyzes the Federal Circuit’s recent important decisions in the
areas of patentable subject matter, product-by-process claims, and written
description doctrine.
A.

Decisional Instrumentalism in the Federal Circuit’s Patentable Subject
Matter Jurisprudence

The patentable (or eligible) subject matter doctrine springs from section
101 of the Patent Act37 and determines what sorts of things should a priori
never be eligible for patenting, no matter how new or ingenious they appear.38
Over the years, the Supreme Court developed at least three general categories
of non-patentable subject matter that can be lumped together as “fundamental
principles”: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.39 Courts
exclude the first two categories on the basis that people do not invent laws of
nature or physical phenomena; rather, they merely discover and/or describe

51 (six amicus briefs); Princo, 616 F.3d at 1321 (five amicus briefs); and Hyatt, 625 F.3d at
1321–22 (seven amicus briefs).
36. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the sua sponte en banc ruling for, inter alia, preventing input from amici
curiae, and stating that “The court has given no notice of this impending en banc action . . . .
[T]he withholding of public notice, or even notice to the parties to this case, is devoid of
justification.”).
37. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”).
38. E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
39. Id. (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable.”).
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them.40 For example, Einstein did not invent his famous equation, E=mc2,
because the mathematical relationship had been true (to its extent) long before
Einstein described it, and he merely discovered and described it.41 Courts
exclude the third category, abstract ideas, in large part because “patents are
issued only for new means to achieve useful results.”42
In its 1972 decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,43 the Supreme Court waded
into an intense debate regarding what sorts of inventions should be eligible for
patenting. While the Benson decision was significant for its time, and was for
a while seen as limiting the patentability of software (but not necessarily much
else), its significance eventually waned.44 Benson would later rise to
prominence thirty-six years later when the Federal Circuit hyper-interpreted it
in its 2008 en banc decision In re Bilski.45 Bilski declared that Benson had
mandated a before-unrecognized exclusive test for determining whether certain
patent claims were directed toward patentable subject matter.46
How could thirty-six years pass during which numerous Federal Circuit
judges not only failed to recognize that Benson decreed a supposedly definitive
and exclusive test, but also crafted and relied on entirely different tests?47
Very likely part of the story is the increased likelihood of Supreme Court
intervention in the area as shown by at least three things. First, as mentioned,
the Supreme Court had been mercilessly reversing the Federal Circuit in the
prior several years. Second, the Supreme Court loudly hinted at its
dissatisfaction with the patentable subject matter doctrine in its 2006 opinion
(including a grumbling dissent) vacating certiorari as improvidently granted in
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.48
Third, the Bilski case had generated intense public interest as shown by the
thirty-nine separate amicus briefs filed for the rehearing en banc.49 Thus, the

40. See, e.g., id. (“Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none.’”) (citation omitted).
41. Id.
42. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] (2010).
43. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
44. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1028–29
(1990).
45. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010). The Supreme Court affirmed the result but rejected the Federal Circuit’s test. Id. at
3231.
46. Id. at 954–56.
47. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text regarding the tests used by the Federal
Circuit from 1972–2008, and infra Part II.A.1.c discussing previous interpretations of Benson.
48. 548 U.S. 124, 125–26, 134–38 (2006) (writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently
granted; dissent by Justice Breyer indicating he would have reversed).
49. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 946–49.
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Federal Circuit had every reason to anticipate Supreme Court review of its
Bilski decision.
That the Federal Circuit expected Supreme Court review heightens the
importance of scrutinizing the Federal Circuit’s decisional methodology. How
did the court write its opinion under the watchful gaze of the Supreme Court?
This Article contends that the Federal Circuit’s Bilski opinion provides the
clearest example of the Federal Circuit’s decisional instrumentalism (the policy
driver being a desire for a more rule-oriented patentable subject matter test)
being eclipsed by an opinion drafted in a decisional formalist style (as
evidenced by overly rigid interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and little
discussion of policy). Of course, that the Supreme Court’s 2010 Bilski v.
Kappos decision rejected the Federal Circuit’s Bilski test50 does not prove that
the Federal Circuit engaged in forced formalism. Instead, one must review the
Federal Circuit’s decision to determine the persuasiveness of its treatment of
precedent. If its interpretation of precedent is unpersuasive, that would suggest
that policy concerns factored into the Federal Circuit’s decision.
1.

The Bilski Decision and its Problematic Interpretation of Benson

Bilski concerned the eligible subject matter doctrine.51 The court found the
Supreme Court’s standard-like test (i.e., “is the patent claim drawn to an
abstract idea or law of nature?”) to be “hardly straightforward,”52 and, true to
its rule-making formalist tendencies, settled on a more rule-oriented test.53
Relying principally on the Supreme Court’s 1972 Benson decision, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court “ha[d] enunciated a definitive test”
for subject matter eligibility, which was that a process claim is not directed to a
fundamental principle if and only if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.”54 This test will be referred to as the “machine-or-transformation test.”
Had the Bilski court simply interpreted Benson as endorsing the machine-ortransformation test as one of several useful tests, no controversy would arise.
The Bilski court, however, construed Benson to make the machine-ortransformation test the exclusive test, rejecting arguments that “the Supreme
Court did not intend the machine-or-transformation test to be the sole test
governing § 101 analyses.”55 This conclusion was surprising, given that the
50. Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226–27, 3231 (affirming the decision of patent invalidity but
holding that the machine-or-transformation test “was not intended to be an exhaustive or
exclusive test” and noting that Benson “explicitly declined” to hold that the test was exclusive).
51. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (analyzing a method for managing the consumption risk costs of a
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price).
52. Id. at 954.
53. See id. at 954–56 (discussing the machine-or-transformation test).
54. Id. at 954.
55. Id. at 955–56.
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Supreme Court decided Benson thirty-six years earlier, and that several other
tests, including the Freeman-Walker-Abele56 and the “useful, concrete, and
tangible result”57 tests, had governed the patentable subject matter inquiry
during those thirty-six years.58
Given the centrality the Bilski court placed on Benson, a detailed review of
Benson is warranted, emphasizing the language relied upon by the Bilski court.
The Benson Court began its legal analysis by quoting the statutory definition of
“process”59 as “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”60 The
Court qualified this broad definition, however, noting that “[p]henomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable.”61
The Court next surveyed several of its nineteenth century decisions and
cited, inter alia, the 1877 case Cochrane v. Deener,62 which stated in dictum,63
[a] process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given
result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be

56. The Freeman-Walter-Abele test became the primary eligible subject matter test during
the first fifteen or so years following Benson. The name comes from the trio of cases from which
it arose: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A.
1980); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The Freeman-Walter-Abele test
essentially asked,
whether a mathematical algorithm is recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is
next determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm
itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied
to or limited by physical elements or process steps.
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Even this test, however, was not an exclusive test. See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838–39
(Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
57. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
58. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958–60 (discussing and rejecting previously adopted tests).
59. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). Benson involved a method for converting
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals, and the question was “whether the
method described and claimed [was] a ‘process’ within the meaning of the Patent Act.” Id. at 64.
60. Id. at 64 n.2 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006)).
61. Id. at 67.
62. 94 U.S. 780 (1877). The crux of the case was whether a patented method for purifying
flour required certain machinery to perform the purification, and the court held that “the process
[was] patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used.” Id. at 787.
The case did not involve the eligible subject matter doctrine.
63. Because Cochrane dealt with infringement of a process claim that required a specific
kind of machinery, and did not mention the eligible subject matter doctrine, the “transformation”
language is dictum with respect to the eligible subject matter doctrine. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (characterizing the Cochrane “transformation” language as dictum).
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transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is
64
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery.

a.

The “Clue” to Patentability

Immediately after quoting Cochrane, the Benson Court stated that
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.”65 (Hereinafter, this Article refers to this language as “the clue”
language.) Without elaborating further on this statement, the Court continued
reviewing its earlier decisions.66
The Bilski court interpreted Benson’s “clue” language as announcing a
mandatory machine-or-transformation test.67 In isolation, reading the “clue”
language as mandating an exclusive test would not be unreasonable—after all,
the Benson Court referred to the test as “the” clue, not one among several
clues. While one could quibble over whether a court should be seen as
enunciating a new exclusive test by using a word as unassuming as “clue,” the
Federal Circuit’s initial reading was not unreasonable, and the court logically
argued that it did “not consider the word ‘clue’ to indicate that the machine-or[transformation] test [was] optional or merely advisory. Rather, the Court
described it as the clue, not merely ‘a’ clue.”68
This would seem a reasonable interpretation if the “clue” language
appeared in a vacuum. But, of course, it did not. Instead, the Benson Court
quickly qualified its opinion with a caveat, as discussed next.
b.

The Caveat: “We do not hold”

Just three paragraphs after penning the “clue” language, the Benson Court
concluded its review of precedent and then, in what this Article will refer to as
“the caveat,” summarized what it did not decide:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a “different state or
thing.” We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
69
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.

After the reader digests the triple-negation (“not-no-not”), the plain
meaning of this caveat is that the Benson Court itself explicitly foreclosed an
interpretation of an exclusive machine-or-transformation test. What else could
“we do not hold” mean?

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added).
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (emphasis added).
See id. at 70–71.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 955–56 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 956 n.11.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
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The Bilski court acknowledged the caveat language, but characterized the
Benson Court as merely “equivocal in first putting forward this test.”70 This
leads to an apparent contradiction: how could the Benson Court have both
established a test that is not “optional or merely advisory,” and yet been
“equivocal?” The Federal Circuit did nothing to address this contradiction, nor
does it appear the court could have convincingly defended its overinterpretation of Benson.
Further, the “we do not hold” caveat is not equivocal—it is decidedly
straightforward. Indeed, the Federal Circuit majority in Bilski used almost
identical we-do-not-hold language to clarify that its opinion in In re
Comiskey71 should not be misunderstood as having generated a new patentable
subject matter test, stating simply, “[w]e did not so hold.”72 It is difficult to
explain how the Federal Circuit majority could have been comfortable with the
clarity of the words “we did not so hold” in its own opinion, while finding
equivocation in Benson’s “we do not hold.”
Hence, it appears the Bilski court knowingly hyper-interpreted Benson to
justify administering its more favored rule-oriented test. This conclusion is
bolstered by reviewing the Federal Circuit’s interpretations of Benson over the
thirty-six years preceding the Bilski decision, as will be seen in the following
section.
c.

Prior Federal Circuit Interpretations of Benson

In rigidly construing Benson as requiring an exclusive machine-ortransformation test, the Federal Circuit paid scant attention to its own decisions
dating back to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) (the
predecessor to the Federal Circuit).73 The CCPA first considered whether
Benson mandated a machine-or-transformation test in In re Waldbaum.74
Relying on the Benson Court’s “caveat” language,75 the Waldbaum court
concluded that “the Supreme Court [in Benson] clearly did not say that only
those process claims which are ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ or

70. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
71. 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (evaluating whether a claimed process was
patentable subject matter).
72. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 (“Some may suggest that Comiskey implicitly applied a new §
101 test that bars any claim reciting a mental process that lacks significant ‘physical steps.’ We
did not so hold, nor did we announce any new test at all in Comiskey.”); see also id. at 950 n.1
(“Although our decision in Comiskey may be misread by some as requiring in every case that the
examiner conduct a § 101 analysis before assessing any other issue of patentability, we did not so
hold.”).
73. See Janicke, supra note 2, at 655, 659 (discussing the creation of the Federal Circuit).
74. 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
75. For an explanation of the “caveat” language in Benson, see supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
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which ‘must operate to change articles or materials to a “different state or
thing”‘ are statutory.”76
Subsequent CCPA decisions did not challenge or contradict the Waldbaum
court’s interpretation that Benson did not require a machine-or-transformation
test. Indeed, the final CCPA opinion to consider this aspect of Benson, In re
Meyer,77 again relied on the Benson “caveat” to conclude that the machine-ortransformation test “was not intended to be the exclusive test for determining
the presence of statutory subject matter.”78
In 1982, the CCPA merged with the Court of Claims to create the Federal
Circuit.79 Early Federal Circuit decisions did not interpret Benson as requiring
a machine-or-transformation test.80 The first Federal Circuit case to interpret
Supreme Court precedent as requiring something like a machine-ortransformation test was In re Schrader,81 where the court required
“transformation . . . of subject matter” but did not discuss an alternative
“machine” requirement.82 The Schrader court defended the transformation
requirement as mandated by Cochrane83 and as “reflected . . . imperfectly in
Benson.”84
The Schrader decision is less defensible than the Bilski majority’s, as it did
not even refer to the Benson Court’s caveat and instead only quoted Benson’s
“clue” language in isolation.85 Further, Schrader conflicted with binding
precedent of the CCPA’s Meyer decision.86 Regardless, future Federal Circuit

76. Waldbaum, 559 F.2d at 617 (emphasis added).
77. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
78. Id. at 796 & n.5.
79. See Janicke, supra note 2, at 655, 659.
80. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838–41 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (same).
81. 22 F.3d 290, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (involving patent claims to a method of conducting
and completing an auction of multiple items so as to maximize—or minimize—the total price).
82. Id. at 294.
83. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text discussing Cochrane v. Deener.
84. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 295. Regarding the “imperfection” in Benson, the court noted that
while Benson referred to transformation of an “article,” Cochrane referred to transformation of
the “subject matter.” Id. at 295 n.13. The court deemed this “significant” because the term
“subject matter” would include “changes to intangible subject matter representative of or
constituting physical activity or objects.” Id. at 295 n.12. This is potentially a broader
interpretation than the Federal Circuit’s Bilski interpretation.
85. See id. at 295.
86. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text discussing Meyer. The CCPA decided
Meyer on September 16, 1982, and it was thus among the decisions the Federal Circuit adopted as
binding precedent, namely, the “holdings [of the CCPA] . . . announced . . . before the close of
business September 30, 1982.” S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
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panels considering section 101 effectively ignored Schrader’s novel
interpretation of Benson/Cochrane and instead followed other tests.87
While the en banc Federal Circuit is not bound by CCPA or panel
decisions, in light of the court’s insistence that Benson mandated the result in
Bilski, it would have been preferable for the court to have explained the
significance of the previous thirty-six years of contrary Federal Circuit/CCPA
interpretations of Benson.
2.

The Bilski Majority’s Problematic Interpretation of Diehr

In addition to relying on Benson as requiring an exclusive machine-ortransformation test, the Bilski court relied on Diamond v. Diehr,88 which came
nine years after Benson. The Diehr Court held that a process for curing
synthetic rubber, where some steps used a mathematical formula and a
computer, was patentable subject matter.89 The Diehr Court surveyed the
relevant case law, including Cochrane, Parker v. Flook,90 and Benson, noting
that Benson added to Cochrane’s definition of “process” that “[t]ransformation
and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”91
Diehr did not further discuss Benson’s “clue” language, and it did not repeat or
discuss Benson’s we-do-not-hold caveat.
a.

Affirmation by Silence—the Missing Caveat

The Bilski majority seized on Diehr’s omission of the we-do-not-hold
caveat as further evidence that the Supreme Court had adopted the machine-ortransformation test as the exclusive test for claims involving fundamental
principles. In the Bilski court’s words,

87. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting
arguments for an exclusive transformation test and stating that “‘physical transformation’ . . . . is
not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm may
bring about a useful application”); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (relying on a “useful, concrete and tangible result” test and
omitting entirely any discussion of a mandatory transformation test, as well as any discussion of
Cochrane, Benson, or Schrader in relation thereto); see In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1359 &
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (advocating “eschewing efforts to describe nonstatutory subject matter in
other terms,” including Cochrane’s machine-or-transformation language). But see In re
Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that “a claim reciting an algorithm or
abstract idea can state statutory subject matter only if, as employed in the process, it is embodied
in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”).
88. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
89. Id. at 175, 184.
90. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Because the Federal Circuit majority in Bilski did not rely heavily
on Flook, and Flook is at best neutral to this analysis, it will not be separately addressed.
91. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
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[Benson’s we-do-not-hold] caveat was not repeated in Diehr when the Court
reaffirmed the machine-or-transformation test. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184
(quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). Therefore, we believe our reliance on the
Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test as the applicable test for §
92
101 analyses of process claims is sound.

The Bilski majority’s reaffirmation-by-silence theory is difficult to
swallow. It stands, of course, on the flawed foundation that Benson itself
introduced the machine-or-transformation test as exclusive. Accepting that
Benson did not mandate the test, it strains the mind to conclude that Diehr
intended to use silence and negative inference to clandestinely introduce a
mandatory test that Benson and Flook93 explicitly refused to adopt. The
Supreme Court is no stranger to introducing new mandatory tests, and it would
be awkward for it to mandate a test in such a diffident manner.
Indeed, to interpret Diehr’s missing caveat as announcing a binding test,
one must attribute to the Supreme Court either an almost playful subtlety or a
quote-cropping revisionism. If Diehr announced an exclusive test, one would
expect the Court to discuss why it decided finally to remove the “caveat”
employed by Benson and Flook. Instead, most plausibly, Diehr cited Benson
simply to introduce the legal framework it had developed for analyzing eligible
subject matter. To be sure, the Federal Circuit should be applauded for
carefully reading and recognizing that Diehr omitted the Benson “caveat.”
Nevertheless, the conclusion based on this language alone seems overstated
and thus driven by other motives.
Further, the Federal Circuit’s theory that Diehr mandated or confirmed an
exclusive test by silence is highly unlikely in light of Diehr’s own
characterization of Benson. In summing up its prior precedent, the Diehr
Court noted that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
“[e]xcluded from such patent protection” and stated that Benson “stand[s] for
Thus, rather than
no more than these long-established principles.”94
reaffirming that Benson announced a new, exclusive, rule-like test, the Diehr
Court seems to have limited Benson as reaffirming the unremarkable and longestablished standard against patenting laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.

92. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
93. Flook stated: “An argument can be made, however, that this Court has only recognized a
process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or
operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ See Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780,
787–788. As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet
one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents. 409 U.S. at 71.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9.
94. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
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What Does “e.g.” Mean?

Diehr’s concluding section summarized that a mathematical formula by
itself cannot be patented, and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attaching insignificant post-solution activity to a formula.95 On the other hand,
the Court stated,
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that
formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
96
satisfies the requirements of § 101.

The abbreviation “e.g.,” of course, derives from the Latin phrase “exempli
gratia” and is a non-exclusive term meaning “for example.”97 Yet the Bilski
court, in a leap of creative lexicography, stated, “as we noted in AT&T,
language such as the use of ‘e.g.’ may indicate the Supreme Court’s
recognition that the machine-or-transformation test might require modification
in the future.”98
There are two problems with the Federal Circuit’s defining “e.g.” as
“might require modification in the future.” First, and most obviously, no
dictionary defines “e.g.” that way. Second, to the extent that the Bilski court
indicated that this novel definition arose in the Federal Circuit’s AT&T99
decision, such a reading of AT&T is patently incorrect. AT&T held the
opposite, stating that Diehr’s “‘e.g.’ signal denotes an example, not an
exclusive requirement.”100 In fact, AT&T necessarily found no mandatory
machine-or-transformation test in Diehr (or Benson), as AT&T applied a
different test (the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test) for patentable
subject matter.101

95. Id. at 191–92.
96. Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “e.g.” as an
abbreviation meaning “for example”).
98. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
99. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358–61.
100. Id. at 1359; see also id. at 1358–59 (“The notion of ‘physical transformation’ can be
misunderstood. In the first place, it is not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of
how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application.”).
101. Id. at 1358–60. Other Federal Circuit and CCPA opinions likewise failed to see a
mandatory machine-or-transformation test in Diehr. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (interpreting Diehr as standing for the straightforward concept “that
certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract
ideas until reduced to some type of practical application”); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915
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Thus, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Diehr is difficult to support
and is largely contrary to the previous twenty-seven years of analysis.
In sum, analysis of Bilski and the supposedly controlling precedent reveals
that the precedent did not mandate the outcome. Indeed, the Bilski opinion
itself implicitly acknowledged this when it stated, “we certainly do not rule out
the possibility that this court may in the future refine or augment the test or
how it is applied.”102 One must ask—if the Supreme Court truly mandated an
exclusive machine-or-transformation test, how would the Federal Circuit be
free to refine or augment the test? To be sure, Benson and Diehr are not
models of clarity.103 Nevertheless, recognizing what a decision does not say is
easier than recognizing what it does say. Because Supreme Court precedent
did not mandate the opinion’s outcome, it is likely that the Federal Circuit’s
opinion resulted in part from a desire to justify a desired rule-oriented test.
This Article will analyze potential reasons for and offer a critique of the
Federal Circuit’s decisional methodology in Part III. First, however, this
Article discusses additional opinions that follow Bilski’s tendency toward
forced decisional formalism.
B.

Decisional Instrumentalism in the Federal Circuit’s Product-by-Process
Claims Jurisprudence

One year after its Bilski decision, the Federal Circuit considered en banc
the proper test for infringement of “product-by-process” patent claims in
Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.104 Just as in Bilski, the majority wrote in a
decisional formalistic style, claiming Supreme Court precedent required a
certain outcome,105 but a critical reading indicates that the precedent, while not
inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, did not require it. Instead,
decisional instrumentalism motivated the decision: its policy-based goal of
relative certainty led to the bright-line, rule-oriented result.
1.

Product-By-Process Claims

Product-by-process claims, as their name implies, attempt to cover a
product (e.g., a chemical) with reference not to the product’s characteristics,

(C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting that the second part of the Freeman-Walter test used by the CCPA
“conforms to the [Diehr] opinion”).
102. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
103. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 44, at 1053, 1101–02 (describing Benson as “not a
model of clarity” and noting that Diehr is open to various interpretations); John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1999) (describing Benson as a
“cryptic opinion”).
104. 566 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court sua sponte considered Section III.A.2
of the opinion en banc. Id. at 1291 n.1.
105. Id. at 1291–92.
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but rather with reference to the process by which the product is made.106 For
example, a simplified product-by-process patent claim might read “Chemical
X, prepared by steps A, B, and C.” An inventor might claim Chemical X in
this way for one of two reasons: (1) it is a “new, indescribable product,” that is,
the inventor may not yet be able to adequately describe (for patenting
purposes) exactly what Chemical X is, perhaps because it is a very complex
chemical; or (2) it is an “old product from a new process,” that is, Chemical X
may be a well-known chemical, but the inventor has developed a new (perhaps
cheaper) way to make it using steps A, B, and C.
While it may sound surprising, a “new, indescribable product”107 is not
unheard of, especially in the chemical and biological fields where describing a
new compound in a manner detailed enough to obtain a patent may be
difficult.108 A scientist may know how to make a compound (e.g., an amino
acid sequence or a complex chemical) and may know what it is useful for, but
the scientist may not be able to describe its exact chemical structure and
geometry.
The distinction between a new, indescribable product and an old product
from a new process lay at the heart of a schism among Federal Circuit judges
regarding how to analyze infringement of product-by-process claims.109 The
debate centered around whether an accused product would infringe a productby-process claim only when the accused product was made by the same
process as recited in the claim, or whether infringement was not limited by the
recited process (that is, that the same product made by other methods would
still infringe). The 1991 decision of Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc.110 held that product-by-process claims drawn to a new,
indescribable product “are not limited to product prepared by the process set
forth in the claims.”111

106. Id. at 1291.
107. As used in this Article, the phrase “indescribable product” refers to a product that cannot
be fully described as required for patentability purposes (e.g., the enablement requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)), not that it literally cannot be described in any manner.
108. See, e.g., Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(quoting In re Painter, 57 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 999 (1891), as stating that some new products
“cannot be properly defined and discriminated from the prior art otherwise than by reference to
the process of producing it”); Don J. DeBenedictis, Inconsistent Patent Rulings, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 36, 36 (“Companies increasingly use [product-by-process] claims to patent complex new
chemicals or drugs whose structure is not fully understood.”).
109. See Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1291 (discussing the split in Federal Circuit cases).
110. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 1583. This sentence is an oversimplification of the holding and the debate. The
language of Scripps Clinic did not distinguish between claims to “new, indescribable products”
and “old product, new process,” but the product in Scripps Clinic was a new, indescribable
product. See Atl. Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1282 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of
request for rehearing en banc). The dissent in Abbott Labs also highlights the distinction between
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Just one year later, in Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex Corp.,112 a
different Federal Circuit panel held the opposite, stating, “process terms in
product-by-process claims serve as limitations in determining infringement”113
regardless of whether the product was indescribable at the time of patenting.
The Atlantic Thermoplastics court attempted to justify its apparent refusal to
follow Scripps Clinic by briefly arguing—in a footnote—that Scripps Clinic
failed to consider controlling Supreme Court precedent and thus was not
binding.114 While this Article does not argue which test should be preferred, it
should be clear that the Scripps Clinic rationale would provide stronger
protection for the indescribable product patent holder (because product-byprocess claims would capture any users of the product, regardless how it is
made), while the Atlantic Thermoplastics test would provide a bright-line rule
(all product-by-process claims are limited by process steps for infringement
purposes), but weaker protection.115 Regardless, the battle between the
conflicting Scripps Clinic and Atlantic Thermoplastics panel decisions and
their progeny lasted eighteen years until the en banc portion116 of Abbott Labs
sided with the Atlantic Thermoplastics rationale. Abbott Labs thus established
a bright-line rule that to infringe a product-by-process claim the accused
infringer must practice the claimed process, regardless of whether the claim
was drawn to a new, indescribable product or an old product from a new
process.117 This decision thus negated the need in an infringement analysis to
inquire into whether a product was “indescribable” at the time of patenting.
Although the Federal Circuit crafted its opinion as if Supreme Court
precedent predetermined the result, a close reading of Abbott Labs reveals that
decisional instrumentalism motivated the majority rather than the purportedly
binding precedent. To support this contention, the next sections review the
Abbott Labs decision and the Supreme Court precedent on which it relied.

claims to a new, indescribable product and claims to an old product, but new process. Abbott
Labs, 566 F.3d at 1300 (Newman, J., dissenting).
112. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 846–47.
114. Id. at 839 n.2 (determining that “the prior panel would have reached a different
conclusion if it had considered controlling precedent”).
115. Supporters of Scripps Clinic argue that because scientists need product-by-process
claims in the most cutting-edge research areas where discoveries outpace science’s descriptors,
the Atlantic Thermoplastics/Abbott Labs bright-line but restrictive rule is likely to lower
incentives to invent (or at least to disclose inventions via patents) in these technologically
advanced fields. See Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1300 (Newman, J., dissenting). The opposing
view retorts that a patentee should not gain patent protection greater than what she has disclosed.
Id.
116. The court sua sponte took Section III.A.2 of the opinion en banc before issuing a panel
opinion. Id. at 1291 n.1.
117. Id. at 1293.
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The Federal Circuit’s Abbott Labs Decision

The Abbott Labs majority opinion supported its holding that the “Supreme
Court has long emphasized the limiting requirement of process steps in
product-by-process claims” by string citing to seven Supreme Court cases.118
The court provided little analysis of these supposedly confining cases, only
discussed one (Cochrane v. BASF), and simply provided parenthetical quotes
from several others.119 Completely absent was any discussion of the cases in
light of the distinction between new, indescribable products versus old
products made from new processes. The majority remedied this reticence to
some extent by also citing to the Federal Circuit’s Atlantic Thermoplastics
decision, which discussed several of the seven cases in more detail.120 The
Atlantic Thermoplastics decision, however, suffers from the same deficiencies
as Abbott Labs: it overstated the import of the Supreme Court precedent
(calling it “controlling”)121 and failed to analyze the precedent in view of the
distinction between new, indescribable products and old products made from
new processes.
None of the cited Supreme Court precedent speaks directly or indirectly to
the scope of product-by-process claims to new, indescribable products. As
Judge Newman detailed in her dissent,122 the most logical explanation for this
dearth of analysis (in both Abbott Labs and Atlantic Thermoplastics) is that
none of the Supreme Court cases concerned a product-by-process claim to a
new, indescribable product. Thus, it is difficult to consider these cases to have

118. Id. at 1291, 1292 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93
U.S. 486 (1877); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222 (1880); Merrill v.
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877); Cochrane v. Badishe Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884);
The Wood-Paper Patent, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874); Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442
(1887); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938)).
119. See id. at 1291–93.
120. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1291 (citing Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d
834, 839–42 (Fed. Cir. 1992), as “discussing each of these [cited Supreme Court] cases”).
121. Atl. Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 838 n.2.
122. See Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1311–15 (Newman, J., dissenting). Only Judge Newman
criticized the majority for mistreating precedent in both Bilski and Abbott Labs. Judges Mayer
and Lourie joined in Judge Newman’s Abbott Labs dissent. Id. at 1299. Judge Lourie also filed a
solo dissent. Id. at 1320. No one joined Judge Newman in her Bilski dissent. Judge Rader (who
signed with the majority in Abbott Labs), however filed a dissenting opinion in Bilski criticizing
the majority for, inter alia, relying on “dicta taken out of context from numerous Supreme Court
opinions dealing with the technology of the past.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1011 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer, who joined in Judge Newman’s Abbott Labs dissent,
filed a solo dissent in Bilski, but he argued that the “technological arts” test, not the machine-ortransformation test, should govern eligible subject matter. Id. at 1009 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
While his dissent did not criticize the Bilski majority’s handling of Supreme Court precedent, it
implicitly refuted the majority’s contention that the Supreme Court’s precedent mandated the
machine-or-transformation test by advocating a different test. Id.
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resolutely restricted the scope of all product-by-process claims in the blanket
manner intimated by the Federal Circuit.
Three of the cases—The Wood-Paper Patent,123 Merrill v. Yeomans,124 and
General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.125—did not even involve
product-by-process claims.126 The patent in Wood-Paper Patent contained one
product and one process claim,127 and the product was an old one.128 The
Merrill Court construed the relevant claim129 as a process claim130 and
indicated the patentee could have described the product.131 The patent in GE
centered on product claims to an allegedly improved tungsten filament,132 and
the Court held the claims invalid as indefinite.133
The remaining four cases relied on by the Abbott Labs majority did not
consider a special rule for new, indescribable products, and each involved

123. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874).
124. 94 U.S. 568 (1877).
125. 304 U.S. 364 (1938).
126. Distinguishing among claims to products, processes, and products-by-process is not
straightforward in these primarily nineteenth century cases because at the time (though no longer)
the law permitted a patentee to draft claims that referred back to the written description for details
of what was claimed (e.g., “I claim the machine X, substantially as described herein.”). See id. at
373.
127. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 593 (“[T]he two reissued patents . . . are to be carefully
distinguished one from the other. The first . . . is a patent for a product or a manufacture, and not
for any process by which the product may be obtained. The second . . . is for a process and not
for its product.”). Note that the Wood Paper Patent case involved several patents, none of which
involved a product-by-process claim. Id. Only the portion to which the Abbott Labs majority
cited is addressed here, which involved technology for pulping wood. Id. at 596.
128. Id. (stating that “the product was in no sense new”). Thus, even if one were to interpret
the product claim as a product-by-process claim, at best it would be an old product made by a
new process, which would not invoke the distinction of a new, indescribable product.
129. Merrill, 94 U.S. at 570 (“‘I claim the above-described new manufacture of the
deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils, suitable for lubricating and other purposes, free from the
characteristic odors of hydrocarbon oils, and having a slight smell like fatty oil, from hydrocarbon
oils, by treating them substantially as is hereinbefore described.’”).
130. Id. at 572 (“It is very clear that what he here calls his invention is a thing which produces
the deodorized oils, and not the oil itself. . . . Here the word ‘manufacture’ is used [in the claim]
in the sense of the word ‘process,’—a word which could be substituted for it, without a shade of
change in the meaning.”).
131. See id. at 573 (“If the patentee is also entitled to a patent for the product of this
distillation, and has failed, as we think he has, to obtain it, the law affords him a remedy, by a
surrender and reissue.”).
132. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 365 (1938). A representative
claim is claim 25: “A filament for electric incandescent lamps or other devices, composed
substantially of tungsten and made up mainly of a number of comparatively large grains of such
size and contour as to prevent substantial sagging and offsetting during a normal or commercially
useful life for such a lamp or other device.” Id. at 368.
133. Id. at 369–70.
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either old products or arguably new products that were capable of description.
Specifically, Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.134 and Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co. v. Davis135 both concerned the same patent claim for false teeth
made by a vulcanization process.136 While the Court interpreted the patent as
not directly claiming the product, the Court’s description of the product
strongly indicates it was describable.137 The patent in Cochrane v. Badische
Anilin & Soda Fabrik (“BASF”)138 claimed an artificially-made dye, alizarine,
which was an old chemical known for many years as an extract of the madder
plant.139 Finally, Plummer v. Sargent140 involved a claim to iron made to
appear like bronze.141 Like in the other cases, the Plummer patent did not
involve a new, indescribable product, because bronzed iron was already
known142 and was seemingly describable.143
Thus, the Supreme Court cases to which Abbott Labs cited either did not
involve product-by-process claims, or involved product-by-process claims to
known and/or describable products. Not surprisingly then, these cases did not
discuss the issue of new, indescribable products. Some of the cases, however,
used broad language that arguably restricts the scope of product-by-process
134. 93 U.S. 486 (1877).
135. 102 U.S. 222 (1880).
136. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 1904 claimed “the plate of hard rubber, or vulcanite, or its
equivalent, for holding artificial teeth, or teeth and gums, substantially as described.” Smith, 93
U.S. at 493.
137. Id. at 494 (“A new product was the result . . . differing in kind and having new uses and
properties.”); Id. at 497 (“[The invention] produced a manufacture long sought but never before
obtained,—a set of artificial teeth, light and elastic, easily adapted to the contour of the mouth,
flexible, yet firm and strong, consisting of one piece, with no crevices between the teeth and the
plate, impervious to the fluids of the mouth, unaffected by the chemical action to which artificial
teeth and plates are subjected when in place, clean and healthy,—peculiarities which distinguish it
from everything that had preceded it.”).
138. 111 U.S. 293 (1884).
139. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 4321 claimed “[a]rtificial alizarine, produced from anthracine or
its derivatives by either of the methods herein described, or by any other method which will
produce a like result.” Id. at 296. At the time of invention, the inventors believed that the product
made according to the patent was pure alizarine, identical to the known product found in madder
root. Id. at 309. The patent, therefore, did not attempt to define the product, and focused only on
the process to make it. Id. at 310 (“If the words of the claim are to be construed to cover all
artificial alizarine, . . . [produced by any method], we then have a patent for a product or
composition of matter, which gives no information as to how it is to be identified.”).
140. 120 U.S. 442 (1887).
141. Id. at 445 (“‘What I claim and desire to secure by letters-patent is the new manufacture
hereinabove described, consisting of iron ornamented in imitation of bronze by the application of
oil and heat, substantially as described.’”).
142. Id. at 446–49 (indicating that F.W. Brocksieper had earlier invented the product, bronzed
iron).
143. Id. at 448 (describing (though not necessarily in sufficient detail for a patent) the product
of the inventor’s process).
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claims.144 Such passages, of course, are dicta as applied to new, indescribable
products, and thus could not require the blanket test that Abbott Labs argued
was required.145 The concern is not that the Abbott Labs decision was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court cases, but rather that it hyper-construed
their directives. Abbott Labs failed to acknowledge the limitations of the
Supreme Court authority, and instead, compiled “a collection of dicta lifted out
of context.”146
3.

Dicta and Context

Analysis of the purportedly-controlling Supreme Court cases would not be
complete without analyzing the context of the language relied upon in Abbott
Labs. The various quotes in isolation may seem to support the Abbott Labs
majority’s view that process steps always limit infringement of product-byprocess claims. Nevertheless, “Supreme Court precedent dealing with old
products . . . utilizing broad language, does not foreclose” treating differently
product-by-process claims directed to new, indescribable products.147 Rather
than writing as if the Supreme Court precedent inevitably leads to its holding,
the majority would have done better by acknowledging the cases contain
ambivalence and/or dicta, and proceeding to discuss the merits of its desired
rule, the policy behind it, and the effects it would have. Instead, the opinion
mentions little other than precedent, and is “without explanation of what policy
is intended to be served by [the holding].”148
For example, the Abbott Labs majority emphasized BASF’s statement that
“[e]very patent for a product or composition of matter must identify it so that it
can be recognized aside from the description of the process for making it, or

144. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 493 (1877) (“The
process detailed is thereby made as much a part of the invention as are the materials of which the
product is composed.”).
145. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme
Court has long emphasized the limiting requirement of process steps in product-by-process
claims.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1291 (“This rule finds extensive support in Supreme
Court opinions that have addressed the proper reading of product-by-process claims. . . . In these
cases, the Supreme Court consistently noted that process terms that define the product in a
product-by-process claim serve as enforceable limitations.”); id. at 1293 (“Thus, based on
Supreme Court precedent and the treatment of product-by-process claims throughout the years by
the PTO and other binding court decisions, this court now restates that ‘process terms in productby-process claims serve as limitations in determining infringement.’” (quoting Atl.
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); Atl.
Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 838 n.2 (stating that the earlier Scripps Clinic panel opinion would
not be followed as precedent because it failed to consider Supreme Court controlling precedent).
146. Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
147. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1320 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1300 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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else nothing can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that
process.”149 Taken in isolation, this language seems to support the Abbott Labs
court’s bright-line rule. Aside from the fact that BASF did not involve a new,
indescribable product, however, this language was written in the context of one
of three alternative views of the case and the Court worrying about the patentee
attempting to cover multiple products with a single claim.150
The BASF Court offered three views of the scope of product-by-process
claims without deciding among them. In the first view, the Court could
construe the product-by-process claims to cover the exact product allegedly
made by the process (i.e., 100% pure alizarine),151 but in that case the
defendant would not infringe because its product was not pure.152 In the
second view,153 the Court could construe the claims to cover multiple products,
but the BASF Court found this unacceptable because the patent failed to
disclose all the products it purported to cover and did not disclose processes for
making those products.154 In the third view, the Court could construe the
claims to cover any mixture containing alizarine, but that product was “old,”
and thus the patent would be invalid for lack of novelty.155 The BASF opinion

149. Id. at 1292–93 (emphasis removed) (quoting Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda
Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)).
150. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. at 309 (“The articles in market, called artificial
alizarine . . . are substances all of which are made from anthracine, but they vary [in their
components].”).
151. This interpretation would contravene the Abbott Labs rule.
152. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. at 309 (“If the words of the claim ‘by any
other method which will produce a like result’ mean any other method which will produce the
only product mentioned in the description, namely, alizarine, as then understood, having the
formula C14H8O4, the defendants’ article is not that product, for it contains other dyeing
ingredients which the alizarine of the patent does not contain.”).
153. This “second” view inspired the broad dicta relied on by Abbott Labs.
154. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. at 310 (“If the words of the claim are to be
construed to cover all artificial alizarine, whatever its ingredients, produced from anthracine or its
derivatives . . . we then have a patent for a product or composition of matter, which gives no
information as to how it is to be identified.”); see also id. at 312 (“Still further, the claim of No.
4,321 is not a claim merely for the product of the process described in it, but is a claim for
anything which may be called artificial alizarine . . . .”).
155. Id. at 311–12 (“There is another view of the case. . . . [T]he article produced by the
process [claimed] was the alizarine of madder, having the chemical formula C14H8O4. It was an
old article. While a new process for producing it was patentable, the product itself could not be
patented, even though it was a product made artificially for the first time . . . . [I]t was set forth as
alizarine, a well-known substance. There was, therefore, no foundation for reissue No. 4,321, for
the product, because, on the description given, no patent for the product could have been taken
out originally.”) (citation omitted).
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did not decide among the views,156 leaving unresolved the scope of productby-process claims for infringement purposes.
Perhaps the most interesting dicta appear in General Electric v. Wabash,157
which concerned claims to a tungsten filament having advantageous crystalline
characteristics.158 Even though the claims at issue contained no process
steps,159 and thus the Court’s statements about the scope of product-by-process
claims are dicta, the case appears to broach the concept of an indescribable
product. The appeals court below had noted that “in view of the difficulty, if
not impossibility, of describing adequately a number of microscopic and
heterogeneous shapes of crystals, it may be that [the inventor] made the best
disclosure possible . . . .”160 Notwithstanding this difficulty, the Supreme
Court held the patent invalid for failing to distinctly claim the invention.161 In
this context, the Court stated,
[a]lthough in some instances a claim may validly describe a new product with
some reference to the method of production, a patentee who does not
distinguish his product from what is old except by reference, express or
constructive, to the process by which he produced it, cannot secure a monopoly
162
on the product by whatever means produced.

The Court went on to support dicta with dicta, quoting BASF’s statement
that “[e]very patent for a product or composition of matter must identify it so
that it can be recognized aside from the description of the process for making
it, or else nothing can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that
process.”163 The GE Court’s words are open to several interpretations, at least
one of which would support the Abbott Labs court’s bright-line rule.
Nevertheless, the words remain dicta.
Thus, none of the cases discussed the scope of a product-by-process claim
to a new, indescribable product. Broad dicta appear in other decisions, but
largely duplicate the above-discussed instances.164 While the Supreme Court

156. Id. at 313 (“It results, from these considerations, that, if the claim of No. 4,321 is to be
construed so broadly as to cover the defendants’ article, it is [invalid]; and that, if it is to be
construed so as to cover only the product which the process described in it will produce,
[defendants do not infringe]. In either view, The decree of the Circuit Court must be
reversed . . . .”).
157. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938).
158. Id. at 368.
159. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
160. Gen. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. at 372 (quoting the appellate court but providing no citation).
161. Id. at 369–71.
162. Id. at 373 (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 373–74 (quoting Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310
(1884)).
164. See, e.g., Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 571 (1877) (“[B]y the well-settled rules of
construing all instruments, some importance must be attached to [the words of the claim
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cases do not preclude the rule laid down in Abbott Labs, neither do they require
it. It would therefore appear that something else helped dictate the outcome in
Abbott Labs. That “something” seems to be the desire for bright-line rules.
Yet as Judge Lourie stated in dissent, “[b]right lines have their uses, but
judging should take account of differing circumstances.”165
C. Decisional Instrumentalism in the Federal Circuit’s Enablement and
Written Description Jurisprudence
The final en banc decision in the trilogy analyzed by this Article occurred
one year after Abbott Labs. In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co,166 the Federal Circuit considered what a patent applicant must disclose to
obtain a patent.167 As the quid pro quo for exclusive patent rights, the inventor
must disclose the invention to the public via the patent document. In this
manner, the inventor adds to the public’s storehouse of technological
information, allowing others to learn from and improve upon that which the
inventor invented.168 The inventor’s requirement to disclose the invention is
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, which states in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to
169
make and use the same . . . .

While it was always clear from the statute that an applicant had to provide
a written description that “enabled” the invention, it was not always clear that
the written description had to do anything else. A specific “written
description” requirement separate from enablement had its humble, and some
argue questionable,170 beginning in In re Ruschig.171 Since that time, the
indicating a process]; and, if they are to be regarded at all, they must either refer to the process of
making the oils [or to the product only when made by the specific process].”).
165. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Lourie, J.,
dissenting).
166. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
167. Id. at 1340.
168. E.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 127–131
(2006).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
170. See Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–
69 (2000); Laurence H. Pretty, The Recline and Fall of Mechanical Genus Claim Scope Under
“Written Description” in the Sofa Case, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 469, 471 (1998);
Kevin S. Rhoades, The Section 112 “Description Requirement”—A Misbegotten Provision
Confirmed, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 869, 902 (1992). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin,
The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1141, 1200–02 (2008) (arguing that William Robinson’s famous 1890 Patent Law treatise
discussed a separate written description requirement).
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separate written description requirement policed against applicants who, after
filing for the patent, attempt to enlarge their claim scope by claiming new
matter not found in the patent’s specification.172 In policing against new
matter, the written description doctrine required a patent’s disclosure to convey
to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor “possessed” any
subsequently-claimed subject matter as of the application’s effective filing
date.173 Because the separate written description requirement was applied
against an applicant adding broader claims, it traditionally did not apply to
originally filed claims, because it would seem obvious that an inventor
necessarily “possessed” whatever claims were filed with the original
application.174
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,175 a Federal
Circuit panel extended this traditional interpretation of the written description
requirement and applied the requirement to police even originally-filed
claims.176 This doctrinal shift has been widely condemned, especially by
commentators familiar with the biotech industry, who perceive the shift as
directed specifically at that industry.177
The controversy surrounding the written description doctrine persisted, and
when the Federal Circuit agreed to hear the Ariad case en banc, the public
followed the Ariad case with interest, filing twenty-five separate amicus briefs.
The Ariad decision confirmed both the separate role of the written description
requirement and its applicability to originally-filed claims, regardless of
whether the patent relates to biotechnology.178 While this Article takes no
position on the “correctness” of Ariad, given the criticism surrounding the

171. 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (drawing a distinction between describing a
product and providing information sufficient to enable an interested party to make the product).
172. See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5–6 (2007) (citing 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §7.04
(2005)).
173. See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“To fulfill the written description
requirement, the patent specification ‘must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’”).
174. See Holman, supra note 172, at 6; Holbrook, supra note 168, at 127–28.
175. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case, scientists at the University of California
(“UC”) successfully cloned the rat insulin gene. The patent specification provided the chemical
structure of the rat gene (but not the human gene) and a description of how one would go about
isolating the gene from other mammals, including humans. Id. at 1562–63.
176. Id. at 1566–67.
177. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L. J.
779, 794–95 (2011); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998).
178. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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written description doctrine, the public interest in the Ariad case itself, and the
Supreme Court’s recent scrutiny of Federal Circuit decisions, an analysis of the
Federal Circuit’s written opinion justifying its decision is warranted. As will
be seen, the Federal Circuit’s methodology mirrors, though to a lesser extent,
that of its Bilski and Abbott Labs decisions.
Ariad considered two questions. First, it asked whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶
1, contained a written description requirement separate from an enablement
Second, if there was a separate written description
requirement.179
requirement, it asked what was the scope and purpose of that requirement.180
Because the court did not rely on Supreme Court precedent in answering the
second question,181 the present analysis will focus on the court’s justification
of its answer to the first question. Answering the first question in the
affirmative, the Federal Circuit asserted that Supreme Court precedent
mandated the outcome in the case.182
As evidence of precedent supposedly mandating a separate written
description doctrine, the Ariad court first183 pointed to the 1938 Supreme Court
decision in Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.184 The Ariad court
recognized that the Schriber-Schroth Court “did not expressly state that it was
applying a description of the invention requirement separate from
enablement,” but nevertheless resolutely asserted that “that is exactly what the

179. Id. at 1342.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1349–51. Most of the public interest in the case centered not on the first
question, but on the second, and thus this Article’s thesis would predict the Federal Circuit would
hyper-interpret Supreme Court precedent to justify its contentious conclusion, which the court did
not do. That Ariad did not hyper-construe Supreme Court precedent to justify its decision with
respect to the second question (the scope of the separate written description requirement) may
indicate that the Federal Circuit is beginning to move away from hyper-construction, which
would be a welcome development. Another explanation for this is that there was no precedent to
rigidly construe.
182. Id. at 1345–47.
183. The court, perhaps wisely, did not rely on Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433–
34 (1822) (decided under § 3 of the 1793 Act). Previous CCPA decisions and Federal Circuit
panel decisions invoked that authority to justify a separate written description requirement. See
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560–61 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Evans as evidence
of an “historical” explanation of the separate written description requirement); In re Barker, 559
F.2d 588, 593 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (citing, inter alia, Evans for the proposition that a separate
written description requirement is “a statutory requirement duly recognized by the courts”).
Using Evans as a basis to justify a separate written description requirement has been criticized
because the Supreme Court decided Evans under the Patent Act of 1793, which did not require
enumerated patent claims, and thus the specification (as opposed to present-day claims) needed to
provide the public with notice as to what the patentee considered to be his invention. See Janis,
supra note 170, at 63–64; Rhoades, supra note 170, at 889–90.
184. 305 U.S. 47, 60 (1938) (invalidating later-filed claims to pistons with “flexible” webs
when the original specification only discussed “extremely rigid” webs).
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Court did.”185 The Ariad majority provided no further analysis of or
justification for its characterization of Schriber-Schroth. The absence of
explanation is surprising in that, since the Schriber-Schroth decision in 1938,
no CCPA or Federal Circuit decision cited it to justify a separate written
description requirement.186 The most probable reason for the lack of citation is
that Schriber-Schroth was concerned not with “written description,” but rather
with an applicant adding “new matter”—an act that would forfeit any earlier
priority date as to the newly added matter187—by amending his specification
five years after the original filing date to try to cover a competitor’s product.188
Specifically, the patent applicant amended the application to describe and
claim a “flexible” component when the originally-filed application only
discussed a “rigid” version of the component.189 Thus, Schriber-Schroth did
not involve the question of a separate written description requirement, and the
Federal Circuit arguably read too much in to the decision.
The Ariad court also claimed that Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co.190 was confining precedent on the written description issue,
citing Festo’s statement that “the patent application must describe, enable, and
set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention.”191 This language from
Festo, however, does not clearly enunciate a separate written description
requirement and is undeniably dictum because Festo concerned the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel192—a doctrine far removed from questions of

185. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346.
186. One Federal Circuit dissent cited the case, but not in the context attempting to justify a
separate written description requirement. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d
1013, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citing Schriber-Schroth, 305 U.S. at 57, to
show that the primary purpose of the requirement is to provide public notice to competitors and
the public), vacated, 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the
disclosure of the invention.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2010) (“No new matter may be
introduced into an application after its filing date.”).
188. Schriber-Schroth, 305 U.S. at 55–57.
189. Id. at 56.
190. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
191. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis
removed) (quoting Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736).
192. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 726 (“This case requires us to address once again the relation
between two patent law concepts, the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history
estoppel.”). Normally, a patent holder can prevent an infringer from making insubstantial
changes to its device to avoid the literal meaning of a patent claim limitation. If that claim
limitation was amended during prosecution to make clear the claim did not cover the insubstantial
change, however, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a patent holder from
arguing that an accused device with the insubstantial change infringes the claim limitation under
the doctrine of equivalents.
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enablement and written description.193 Thus, the Festo dictum should not be
viewed as requiring a separate written description requirement.
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of definitive statements with respect to a
separate written description requirement, the Ariad majority asserted that “[a]s
a subordinate federal court, we may not so easily dismiss such statements [by
the Supreme Court in Festo and Schriber-Schroth] as dicta but are bound to
follow them.”194 As in Bilski and Abbott Labs, the Supreme Court’s earlier
cases did not stand in opposition to the Federal Circuit’s desired position, but
once again the Federal Circuit was not satisfied with arguing that its position
was not inconsistent with Supreme Court authority. Instead, the Federal
Circuit insisted the precedent mandated a certain outcome. As in Bilski and
Abbott Labs, the precedent is less confining than the Federal Circuit argued.
If Supreme Court precedent did not mandate the outcome, one must
consider what policy prodded the court toward its decision. Unlike Bilski and
Abbott Labs, which appeared plainly to desire formalistic, relatively ruleoriented results, Ariad appears at first glance to desire the option with more
uncertainty: two separate requirements—written description and enablement
—instead of one—a written description that enables. Indeed, some critics
argue the separate written description requirement, particularly where it is
applied to originally-filed claims, has created uncertainty.195
Thus, while this Article’s identification and criticism of the Federal
Circuit’s forced formalism applies to Ariad, identifying the policy motive
behind the court’s decision requires further analysis. While it is true that a
separate written description requirement does not bring certainty to the law’s
application the way a formalistic, bright-line rule might, it does tend to
encourage formalism—and thus, presumably, certainty—in the manner in
which the court applies the doctrine. Specifically, Professor Timothy
Holbrook has argued that the Federal Circuit has used current written
description and enablement doctrines to marginalize the technical aspects of
the patent document and to elevate its legal aspects.196 By limiting the
technical aspect of the patent document, the court may be trying to generate
certainty ex post by allowing courts to focus on the patent document and its
prosecution history to the exclusion of expert testimony, thus reducing the
costs of analyzing a patent.197 The court may also be attempting to generate

193. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1364 (Rader, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “clearly
overstates the language of Festo”).
194. Id. at 1347.
195. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 168, at 162; Janis, supra note 170, at 69–88; Duane M.
Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description
Requirement as It Applies to Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003).
196. Holbrook, supra note 177, at 783.
197. Id. at 807.
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certainty by creating an ex ante information forcing penalty-default: that is, the
heightened written description requirement forces patent applicants to provide
more disclosure in the patent itself for fear of a court invalidating the patent for
failing to meet an ill-defined written description requirement.198 Hence, the
Federal Circuit’s desire for certainty may well play a part in its insistence on a
separate written description requirement.
In conclusion, Bilski, Abbott Labs, and Ariad each evidence, though in
varying degrees, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudential penchant for writing its
opinions in a decisional formalist style and construing Supreme Court
precedent to require its holdings. Because the precedent does not constrain the
Federal Circuit in the way that it asserts, other goals appear to be prompting
the court to make and justify its decisions. The next Part analyzes why the
court might be engaging in this methodology and the consequences thereof.
III. REASONS FOR AND CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED FORMALISM
In each decision discussed in Part II, the Federal Circuit engaged in forced
formalism to achieve a goal of relative certainty and clarity. Other writers
have well explored the Federal Circuit’s formalist tendencies and predilection
for rules over standards.199 The literature likewise has a rich discussion
concerning the strength and weaknesses of rules and standards and of the
Federal Circuit’s rule-making formalism tendencies.200
What the literature has not thoroughly explored is the Federal Circuit’s
decisional methodology, i.e., how the Federal Circuit justifies its decisions
when it adopts its certainty-engendering tests.201 As shown in Part II, in each
of Bilski, Abbott Labs, and Ariad, the Federal Circuit justified its result using a
decisional formalist style, which resulted in the hyper-construction of flexible
(and sometimes ancient) Supreme Court precedent.

198. Id. at 804–05.
199. See Holbrook, supra note 23; Lee, supra note 3; Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the
Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51 (2010); Thomas, supra note 3.
200. See sources cited supra notes 3 and 6; see generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and
Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (2010) (discussing rules and
standards as they relate to patentable subject matter); Kennedy, supra note 20 (discussing, among
other things, the relationship between standards, rules, altruism, and individualism); Russell B.
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV.
23 (2000) (examining standards and rules from a law and behavioral science perspective); Eric A.
Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997) (discussing
the relationship between the economic literature on rules and standards, the economic approach to
social norms, and the rule of law); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1985) (discussing some of the merits of the rules versus standards debate).
201. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought
We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 834 (2010) (noting that rather than discussing policy,
“the [Federal Circuit] has adopted a rather formalistic approach to judging”).
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The Supreme Court precedent discussed in Bilski, Abbott Labs, and Ariad
did not prohibit or discourage the Federal Circuit’s desired results. Thus, the
Federal Circuit was not faced with the task of construing around blocking
precedent, and the court could have correctly stated that its rule was not
inconsistent with precedent. Moreover, the Federal Circuit could have stated
that the precedent “seemed to favor” its position. But the Federal Circuit did
not settle for the “not inconsistent with precedent” position. Instead, it tried to
convince readers that the Supreme Court required the particular test. Further,
an overt discussion of policy, if present at all, was minimal. The next two
sections consider why the Federal Circuit wrote its opinions in this manner.
A.

Forced Formalism as a Response to Supreme Court Scrutiny

The Supreme Court has entered a period of keen interest in patent law,202
and this certainly factors into the Federal Circuit’s style in opinion writing.
While the Supreme Court rarely took patent cases in the Federal Circuit’s early
years—it only took five patent cases in the Federal Circuit’s first twelve
years—the honeymoon period has been over for some time.203 In the next
twelve years, it heard fifteen Federal Circuit patent cases, and at an increasing
rate over time.204 Further, the Federal Circuit’s “success” rate at the Supreme
Court has been dismal of late. Although from 1982 to 2000 the Supreme Court
reversed or vacated the Federal Circuit about 50% of the time (about the same
rate as the national average during that time),205 from 2001–2007 (the years
before the decisions discussed in this Article) the reversal rate for the Federal
Circuit patent decisions was 87.5% compared to about 72% for all circuits.206
Not only does the Supreme Court reverse the Federal Circuit often, but
also its rhetoric toward the Federal Circuit has been described as “severely
critical” and “testy,”207 “increasingly disdainful,”208 and “harsh,”209 particularly
202. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 791; Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 15, at 822–23;
Golden, supra note 8, at 658; Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 15, at 227.
203. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 15, at 822–23; see also John M. Golden, The Federal
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 553, 557–58 (2010) (discussing Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit patent
decisions).
204. See Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 15, at 828–41 (discussing many of the Supreme
Court’s recent patent cases). In addition to the cases discussed therein, in the next two years the
court decided MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp, 550 U.S. 437 (2007), and Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
205. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 282.
206. Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 15, at 241–42. Given that only eight patent cases factor
into these statistics, the results may not be statistically significant.
207. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Lecture, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the
Supreme Court — And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 800, 801 (2010) (noting that the
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when it comes to the Federal Circuit’s failure to follow Supreme Court
precedent. Jabs at the Federal Circuit come not only in Supreme Court
opinions, but also from individual judges during oral argument. Justice Scalia
labeled one Federal Circuit test as “gobbledygook,”210 and Chief Justice
Roberts indicated that the Federal Circuit seemed to feel it was not bound to
follow Supreme Court precedent.211
The negative appraisals are not unidirectional; the Federal Circuit has
bristled a bit itself. In a 2009 lecture, then-Chief Judge Michel discussed the
Federal Circuit’s relationship with the Supreme Court, stating:
For example, in the KSR case, it was said that the Federal Circuit had a rigid
rule and that it used the so-called teaching-motivation-suggestion test as the
sole test, neither of which was true. . . . In fact, there is a certain respect in
which the KSR decision is almost silly. . . . What about Bilski? The Supreme
Court has heard the argument. . . . I’m not in the business of making
predictions, but it’s too hard to resist making a stab at it. I’m going to suggest
that they will affirm the result; they will say that the application claims were
not patentable—exactly what we said—but they’ll say that our reasoning
wasn’t good enough. They will probably say, as they did in KSR, that we were
212
too rigid. We’ll get dinged for being rigid again.

“Follow our precedent!” “Don’t be so rigid!” How is a Court of Appeals
to respond to such harsh directives from the Supreme Court? As this Article
has demonstrated, the Supreme Court’s increased attention has changed what
the Federal Circuit writes, but not necessarily what it does. The directive to be
less rigid has perhaps not been taken to heart, but the directive to follow
precedent has led to abundant attention to even the most ancient Supreme
Court cases.213 In the same lecture quoted above, then-Chief Judge Michel

Supreme Court “has severely criticized the Federal Circuit for departures on precedent” but that
the Supreme Court’s “testiness about the Federal Circuit’s departures from its precedents is often
inappropriate”).
208. Golden, supra note 203, at 559 (quoting Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A
Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 204, 204–05 (2009)).
209. Id. (quoting Debra D. Peterson, Can This Brokered Marriage Be Saved? The Changing
Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit in Patent Law Jurisprudence, 2 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 245 (2003)).
210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(No. 04-1350).
211. Golden, supra note 203, at 560 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862 (2009) (No. 07-1437).
212. Paul Michel, Lecture, Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform:
Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Courts?, 20
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1158 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
213. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 207, at 804 (stating that the Federal Circuit’s Bilski
decision “very deliberately and repeatedly referenced” Supreme Court precedent); Hoffman &
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highlighted the Federal Circuit’s assiduousness concern with precedent in the
Bilski opinion, stating, “if you read our [Bilski] opinion closely . . . it was
utterly plagiarized right out of Supreme Court cases themselves, not out of our
own cases.”214
Given the above-quoted comments, Judge Michel seemed to appreciate
that the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision had changed its rhetoric to discuss
more fully Supreme Court precedent but had not changed its ultimate result,
which was a relatively “rigid” test. Of course, the Federal Circuit judges
joining in the Bilski majority opinion would assert that the Supreme Court
precedent required the rigid test, but this Article is not the first to question that
assertion.215 If, as this Article claims, the Federal Circuit is not changing its
outcomes in light of Supreme Court scrutiny of which it is undoubtedly
aware,216 why has it bothered to change its rhetoric?
The Federal Circuit may have altered its rhetoric because it believed that a
decisional formalistic invocation of a Supreme Court mandate best placed the
opinion to avoid Supreme Court review altogether. To the extent that its
rhetoric convinced the parties of the Supreme Court’s view on the case, a
petition for certiorari would be less likely. In addition, copious citation to
Supreme Court authority might persuade the high Court to stay its hand. Judge
Rader seemed to indicate this view, as it was reported that he “did not expect
that the Supreme Court would favor” granting a writ of certiorari on Bilski, in
part because “‘the Federal Circuit . . . [seemed] to be once again applying the
Supreme Court’s law to the letter.’”217
Relatedly, the Federal Circuit may have been attempting to obtain
affirmance by the Supreme Court. In this era of increased interaction with the
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has become savvier with respect to its
overseer,218 and perhaps is more willing to try to read between the lines of

Kinder, supra note 15, at 254 (“In Bilski, the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision bent over
backwards to show how the adopted ‘machine-or-transformation’ test was not only consistent
with, but closely followed, old Supreme Court precedent.”).
214. Michel, supra note 212, at 1158–59.
215. See supra Part II.A; see also Nard, supra note 199, at 96 (“The extent Supreme Court
precedent demanded that Bilski adopt the machine-transformation test is debatable.”); Darin
Snyder & Mark Davies, The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court (Circa 2009), 19 FED. CIR.
B.J. 1, 10–11 (2009).
216. For discussion by Federal Circuit Judges of the Supreme Court’s treatment of Federal
Circuit decisions see Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 15; Michel, supra note 212.
217. Stefania Fusco, In re Bilski: A Conversation with Judge Randall Rader and a First Look
at the BPAI’s Cases, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 123, 145 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting
an interview with Judge Rader).
218. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 810 (“Starting with its en banc decision in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., the judges on the Federal Circuit have
become quite adept at writing dissents signaling the need for Supreme Court attention.” (footnote
omitted)); Helen Wilson Nies, Dissents at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Review, 45
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Supreme Court precedent. Further, as Judge Posner has noted, an opinion
written in a formalist style can give an air of “inevitability.”219 By anchoring
its opinions in exhaustive analysis of Supreme Court cases, the court may have
believed that its position would be more salable.
That the Federal Circuit was following either of these two rationales finds
some anecdotal support in comparing the Federal Circuit’s opinions in Bilski,
Abbott Labs, and Ariad. Of the three, Bilski by far was the most likely to be
successfully petitioned to the Supreme Court given the amount of attention
surrounding the case220 and the Supreme Court’s signals about its
dissatisfaction with the eligible subject matter doctrine.221 Correlating to the
likelihood of review, in Bilski the Federal Circuit’s hyper-construction of
Supreme Court precedent was more rigorous and pronounced than in Ariad or
Abbott Labs.222
A somewhat opposite explanation for the Federal Circuit’s style of
decisional formalism is that the Federal Circuit is trying to force the Supreme
Court to interpret and take ownership of its aged precedents. Understanding
the application of antebellum Supreme Court opinions can be challenging, but
by taking a firm position on even ancient precedent, the Federal Circuit may
want to force the Supreme Court to confirm or deny the interpretation. In
addition, by portraying the Supreme Court’s cases to require a given test, the
Federal Circuit may be attempting to force the Court to do more than simply
reject a Federal Circuit-made rule and instead announce whether the Court
requires a rule at all.
In the end, various combinations of the above reasons might have played a
part in the decisional style reflected in the opinion, and different judges might
have signed on to a majority decision for different reasons.

AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1996) (describing the Federal Circuit’s inter-circuit conflicts as “a
frequent trigger for Supreme Court review”).
219. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1421, 1430 (1995) (describing the formalist style as containing among other things, “the long
quotations from previous cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent, the euphemisms, and the
exaggerated confidence . . . . [all of which can be] summarized as the ‘rhetoric of inevitability’”).
This style is more likely to be directed at the court’s observers below, not the Supreme Court.
220. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text regarding amicus curiae briefs to the
Federal Circuit in Bilski (thirty-nine), Abbott Labs (zero), and Ariad (twenty-five).
221. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125–26, 134 (2006)
(writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted; dissent by Justice Breyer indicating he
would have reversed).
222. Compare Part II.A, with Parts II.B, and II.C. It should be noted that Ariad does not
perfectly fit this model. While Ariad generated a good deal of public interest, most of the interest
involved the second en banc question concerning the scope of a separate written description
requirement. In the portion of the opinion analyzing this question, the Federal Circuit did not cite
to any Supreme Court authority. One explanation for this is that there was no precedent to rigidly
construe.
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The Federal Circuit’s Aversion to Instrumentalism

Taking the focus off the Supreme Court and putting it on the courts,
administrators, and lawyers under the Federal Circuit’s authority, the Federal
Circuit may have engaged in a bit of “do as I say and not as I do.”
Specifically, the Federal Circuit might believe that formalism should in general
control the reasoning of trial courts, the PTO, and patent lawyers, and thus
wanted its opinion to be of that flavor; all the while allowing itself quiet access
to the policy levers. Yet it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit has followed
such a short-sighted rationale—even if it discussed policy justifications in its
holdings, the substantive rule would bind lower courts.
Instead, it seems the Federal Circuit purposefully shies away from policy
discussion, and at least some on the court seem genuinely to dislike the idea of
supporting holdings with policy rationales,223 perhaps fearing such discussion
would approach judicial activism. By writing in a decisional formalist manner,
the Federal Circuit avoids discussing policy because (it might say) there is no
reason to discuss policy when the precedent is clear and mandatory. Policy
and precedent, however, are not necessarily inconsistent; policy and precedent
may align with or complement each other. Nevertheless, when Supreme Court
precedent does not fully mandate the Federal Circuit’s desired outcome, the
Federal Circuit lately has tended to hyper-construe the precedent rather than
discuss policy.
So strong is the Federal Circuit’s preference against policy analysis that it
at times eschews policy discussion even when the favored policy is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.224 As Professor Dreyfuss has explained, while
policy reticence may have been wise in the early years of an experimental
court, the Federal Circuit is now established.225 To help achieve quality
decisions, Professor Dreyfuss argues, the court should discuss and explain
policy.226

223. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1671; Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 809 (stating that
Federal Circuit “opinions rarely provide insight into the goals the court sees the law as
achieving”); Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 22
(Nov. 2, 2007) (“[For 17 years], not once have we had a discussion as to what direction the law
should take . . . . That is because we are not a policy-making body. We have just applied
precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that have come before us.”); Michel, supra
note 3, at 758; Rai, supra note 24, at 1040–41.
224. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting that the majority decision is “without explanation of what policy is
intended to be served by [the holding]”). But see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (briefly discussing the implications of its decision to the
universities and other researchers of basic science).
225. Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 814–27.
226. Id. at 803–04.
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The extent to which courts should discuss policy in their opinions is open
for debate, but where a court allows policy to influence its decisions, the
argument for discussing policy is stronger. Thus, I agree with those who call
for the Federal Circuit to discuss policy in its opinions, because, as this Article
has contended, the Federal Circuit is motivated by a policy; it has an agenda.
That agenda—as widely regarded by the court’s observers and as described by
then-Chief Judge Michel—is a goal of “predictability.”227 Judge Michel
resisted attaching the label to anything the court does as an “agenda,”228 but it
is difficult to describe a goal for predictability as anything other than a policy.
A policy, among other things, is that which helps a court choose between or
among possible alternative tests (e.g., whether a test should be more rule-based
or standard-based). Hence, a goal of predictability is a policy; a policy that
will generally militate in favor of a rule over a standard. Although stare decisis
no doubt plays a strong and important229 role, predictability as an
instrumentalist goal has led to the rule-making formalism and decisional
formalistic style favored by the Federal Circuit. Thus, whether one thinks the
Federal Circuit should engage in policy analysis when making its decisions,
because the court appears to be doing so already, it should discuss those
policies in its opinions.
An additional contributing explanation for the Federal Circuit’s lack of
policy discussion may relate to its status as the sole appellate court for patent
appeals, a fact that has received criticism of late.230 As the court is not
“competing” with other circuits for influence, it may feel less of a need to
explicate policy rationales. Essentially, the only court the Federal Circuit must
persuade (if it feels the desire to try to persuade) is the Supreme Court, and
entering into a policy debate with a superior court can be fraught with
awkwardness. Moreover, Supreme Court review is relatively rare, and may
not be a strong motivator.
As yet another explanation, it may be that what concerns the Federal
Circuit most is not abdicating all policy analysis, but rather avoiding capital “I”
Instrumentalism (i.e., judicial activism) in favor of judicial minimalism,231 and

227. Michel, supra note 3, at 762 (noting that starting in the late 1980s, the Federal Circuit’s
“focus shifted toward . . . the need for greater clarity, coherence, and predictability”).
228. Id. at 765 (“We really do not have an agenda; actually, it would be very difficult and
undesirable to have an agenda.”).
229. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”).
230. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007) (offering criticism of and proposing solutions to the Federal
Circuit’s centralization).
231. For general discussions of the benfits and drawbacks of both judicial activism and
judicial minimism see, e.g., Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of
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possibly trying to appear ideologically neutral.232 While judicial activism has
recognized pitfalls,233 there are several reasons to push back against the
Federal Circuit’s aversion to policy discussions.
First, there are many definitions of “activism,” and assuming the court has
a policy objective for predictability, such a goal would fall under a broad
definition of judicial activism (e.g., result-oriented judging).234 Second, policy
discussion is not the equivalent of judicial activism, especially in a system like
patent law where Congress enacted a patent statute that intends for judicial
discretion to fill the gaps.235 The provision of relatively unspecific statutes
necessarily invites judicial policy engagement, and such engagement does not
usurp the role of Congress, it instead submits to congressional intent.236
Third, assuming the Federal Circuit wants rules instead of standards,
allowing other policy considerations into Federal Circuit decision-making
would not necessarily lead to standards over rules and would not necessarily
sacrifice predictability. For example, Professors Burk and Lemley urge the
Federal Circuit to allow policy considerations to adapt to industry-specific
needs, and note that “[w]here commonalities within an industry can be
identified, tailoring may sometimes be best accomplished via judicial
application of a bright-line rule.”237 An example of industry-specific
adaptation using formalistic rules may be found (perhaps unintentionally) in
the combination of Bilski (before it was overturned), Abbott Labs, and

“Judicial Activism”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004); Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be
Advice Givers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998); Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism:
Models of Adjudication and the Duty To Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121 (2005); Christopher J. Peters,
Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000); Richard A. Posner,
Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term –Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1996).
232. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 818–19 (citing Matthew Sag et al., The Effect of Judicial
Ideology in Intellectual Property Cases (July 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=997963).
233. For a discussion of several of these pitfalls see, e.g., Mikva, supra note 231.
234. Kmiec, supra note 231, at 1444 (providing primary definitions of judicial activism as:
“(1) invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions of other branches, (2) failure to adhere to
precedent, (3) judicial ‘legislation,’ (4) departures from accepted interpretive methodology, and
(5) result-oriented judging”).
235. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1638 (“While the [Patent] statute sets the
basic parameters for patentability and infringement, it does not specify in detail how those basic
principles are to be applied.”); Rai, supra note 24, at 1116 (“[T]he legislative history and
language of certain patent law provisions . . . strongly indicate that Congress wanted courts to
engage in relatively wide-ranging interpretation of these provisions.”).
236. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1674 (explaining that when judicial discretion is
built into a statute, judges do not avoid or subvert the statute when they engage in policy
discussion); Rai, supra note 24, at 1116–20 (explaining that, through the legislative history and
current structure of the patent statute, Congress has authorized judicial policy development).
237. Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1639.
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Ariad,238 which together may make patenting in the basic sciences more
difficult. Based on these cases, inventors desiring broad protection will be
forced to delay filing patent applications until they have further explored the
basic research. Bilski shifts patenting further downstream than the alreadyprophylactic “abstract ideas” test by preventing patenting until finished
products have been developed.239 In addition, Abbott Labs provides less
protection for new, indescribable inventions, and Ariad’s application of a
separate written description requirement to originally filed claims prevents an
applicant from filing for a patent until the technology is better understood.
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s apparent instrumentalist/policy preference for
predictability and its consequent penchant for rule-making and formalism are
affecting various technologies in specific ways. A discussion of these effects,
limited by the bounds of discretion provided by the patent statute and the
Supreme Court, would seem to constitute a congressionally endorsed exercise
of expertise rather than an undesirable policy agenda.
C. Consequences of Forced Formalism
Regardless of the judges’ intentions, one must consider the potential
consequences of a shift toward forced decisional formalism. Unfortunately,
when a court writes its opinions in a decisional formalist manner that hyperconstrues or ignores precedent, the undiscussed decisional instrumentalism
may yield the negatives of both formalism and instrumentalism: lawyers and
trial judges are left with the impression of rigid formalism, eviscerating much
of the flexibility that is the oft-cited benefit of a policy-driven analysis.
Lawyers would spend time comparing and dissecting unintentional, minute
differences in wording from Federal Circuit decisions240 and neglecting
thoughtful and persuasive argument concerning important policy
considerations.241 Concurrently, the efficiencies and other cited benefits of

238. See supra Part II, discussing each case.
239. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1643–44 (noting that prior to Bilski the “abstract
idea” doctrine “forces patents downstream” and “may have particular importance in
biotechnology, where patenting of upstream research ideas and tools threatens to stifle
downstream innovation”).
240. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 803–04 (“Obscuring policy also makes it difficult for
practitioners to know when the court is changing direction and when it is not. As a result, the
court winds up frustrated by appeals built around minor changes in the wording of particular
holdings.” (citing Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Conflicts and the Federal Circuit, 29 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 835, 837 (1996) (“Both parties may think there is a conflict when the judges do not.”);
Haldane Robert Mayer, Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 767 (2003) (“Too many opinions in well-trod areas of
the law contribute to uncertainty and instability.”))).
241. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 816–17.
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formalism are retarded by potentially confusing and/or inconsistent treatments
of precedent.
Whether one favors formalism or instrumentalism, most would agree that a
court ought to be forthright about its judicial philosophy. Almost a century
ago, the Legal Realist movement blossomed as a result in part of recognizing
aspects of forced formalism similar to those identified in this Article.242 In
turn, the desire for judicial candor and accountability was a prime motivation
behind the Legal Process school’s call for rationally articulated justifications
for judicial decisions.243 The Legal Process school’s call for honest and wellreasoned opinions is one of the most enduring aspects of the movement, as can
be seen by contemporary judges declaring that the “explanatory function of the
opinion is paramount”244 and “[o]pinions must exhibit the qualities of good
moral character: Candor, respect, honesty, and professionalism.”245
Fully-articulated opinions have several advantages. Anyone who has taken
a math course (be it long division, algebra, or calculus) will recall that writing
out the solution’s steps decreases the chance of error and allows observers to
follow and critique the solution’s logic (in turn allowing for every student’s
best friend when the end result is wrong: partial credit). In the same manner, a
court that shows all its reasons for an opinion may reduce error and allow for
robust discussion and analysis.246 Every step in the decision-making process
holds the potential for error that may lead to a sub-optimal decision. No
federal court has the time or resources to micro-analyze every step in its
decision-making process, but by providing the public with a roadmap, the
entire logical chain could be carefully analyzed.
By eschewing policy discussion, however, the Federal Circuit maximizes
the opportunity for at least two errors. First, the court may erroneously adopt a

242. For a more in depth discussion of Legal Realism, see Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 46–52 (Anchor Books 1963).
243. For a more in depth discussion of the Legal Process school, see Alexander M. Bickel &
Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS, 161–
62 (tent. ed. 1958).
244. Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1, 5 (2009).
245. Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237,
238 (2008); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178–81
(1982) (advocating judicial candor); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995) (critically examining the conventional wisdom that judges should
aspire towards candor); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721
(1979) (advocating honesty and candor in judicial opinion writing).
246. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 230, at 1655 (noting that “explication imposes constraints
on the judiciary by allowing outsiders to debate the merits and persuasiveness of these unelected
officials’ work product”).
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more rule-like position than is optimal. While judges and scholars may have a
natural affinity toward rules or standards, general consensus recognizes that
both rules and standards have their place, depending on the substantive area
concerned. Thus, few would say that rules (or standards) are always superior
to the other, and most recognize the best result may sometimes be somewhere
in the middle of the spectrum between a pure rule and a pure standard.
Without open discussion (and an invitation for advocates to discuss) the
policies behind—and consequences of—a given rule, the court increases the
risk of choosing a sub-optimal place on the spectrum.
Second, even assuming the court should adopt a rule-oriented test in a
given substantive area, not all rules are created equally. While the Federal
Circuit’s policy geared toward relatively bright-line rules will generally
achieve precision (defined as “reproducible,” such that those beneath the court
can apply it with greater ease), it will not necessarily achieve accuracy (defined
as “correct,” such that the law is responsive to national goals and the needs of
patent users).247 While a perfect bright-line rule could achieve both precision
and accuracy, limitations on knowledge and foresight make this a practical
impossibility. Given these limitations, the goals of precision and accuracy can
work in opposition to each other.248 By adopting a decisional formalist
rhetoric, and thereby minimizing policy discussion, the Federal Circuit
increases the chances that the bright-line rules it adopts will be inaccurate.
Besides running afoul of accepted jurisprudential standards249 and
increasing the risk of selecting sub-optimal rules, a court that consistently
achieves bright-line, formalist rules by engaging in the questionable
interpretation of precedent may also hamper its efforts toward certainty and
predictability. Though counterintuitive, this collateral uncertainty has at least
two causes. First, the court loses an opportunity to accumulate proper
interpretations of the precedent, or where the precedent is unclear, to highlight
that fact. Second, to the extent that a court stretches the meaning of precedent,
the court obfuscates and renders less useful the mis-analyzed precedent,
instead of illuminating it through sound analysis. As the prominent Legal
Realist Karl Llewellyn250 observed decades ago in the context of courts’
disingenuous contract interpretations, “since [the courts’ methodologies]
purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are intended to, but are
instead tools of intentional and creative misconstruction, they seriously

247. Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 796.
248. Id. at 796–97.
249. See Aldisert et al., supra note 244, at 18 (“The opinion must also be consistent with valid
and binding legal precepts of the legal system.”) (citing NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL THEORY 100-28 (1978)).
250. For a disccusion of the life and works of Karl Llewewllyn, see WILLIAM TWINING,
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (Univ. of Okla. Press, 1985).
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embarrass later efforts at true construction . . . . The net effect is unnecessary
confusion and unpredictability . . . .”251 While the Federal Circuit’s treatment
of precedent does not rise to the level of misconstruction engaged in by the
courts to which Professor Llewellyn directed his critique, the overall principle
applies.
Consider the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Benson in its Bilski
opinion.252 In reinterpreting Benson, the Bilski court largely ignored its
previous thirty-six years worth of decisions interpreting Benson253 and
unsuccessfully glossed over Benson’s declaration that it “[did] not hold”254
what the Bilksi court argued it held. Such brute force analysis engenders
confusion and offers little guidance to the next judge or lawyer who encounters
Benson. Thus, by over-interpreting precedent to implement a more “certain”
rule, the Federal Circuit risks unwittingly bringing collateral uncertainty in the
back door.
In addition, while this Article does not advocate for either instrumentalism
or formalism, others have noted that policy discussions may generate
certainty.255 For example, where the precedent is unclear or leaves discretion,
discussing policy considerations avoids hyper-interpretations of precedent and
provides lawyers and trial courts with guidance. Courts willing to consider
policy may even (though not necessarily) adhere less strongly to stare decisis,
but frank discussions of policy will signal to observers the direction of the
court and will promote reasoned discourse about the policy.
If the court trends further toward forced formalism, in addition to
generating unnecessary uncertainty, problematic treatment of precedent will be
a disservice to the court’s observers.256 Students (reading casebooks) and
lawyers (following opinions) who view the Federal Circuit as an authoritative
example of legal analysis and reasoning will be engulfed in confusion and selfdoubt as they struggle to understand questionable treatment of precedent. As
the court increasingly contorts precedent, such admirers may feel that they lack
proper analytical skills since they cannot understand how the court interpreted
case XYZ in the manner it did. Going the other (and perhaps worse) direction,
those students and lawyers who recognize the questionable treatment of
precedent are likely to grow cynical and distrustful of the court and its

251. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939).
252. See supra Part II.A.1.
253. While the en banc court is not bound to follow any previous panel decisions, recognition
of and explanation for the disparate interpretation would have been preferable.
254. See supra Part II.A.1.b.
255. Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 803 (“Obscuring policy also makes it difficult for practitioners
to know when the court is changing direction and when it is not.”).
256. Appellate judges write for a variety of audiences, including the litigants, the court as an
institution, other courts, lawyers, and law students. See Aldisert et al., supra note 244, at 17–20;
Lebovits et al., supra note 245, at 246.
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decision-making process. “If lawyers ever lose their capacity for believing that
precedents enable them to predict what the courts will do in the future, they
would advise their sons to study dentistry or plumbing or some other
respectable and highly remunerative profession.”257
The Federal Circuit is an excellent and able court, yet if these recent en
banc decisions are a portent of a drift away from judicial candor, eventually the
court will suffer harm to its legitimacy. The drift by the Federal Circuit does
not yet, in this author’s opinion, reveal an institutional lack of integrity or
legitimacy. Yet there is a chance that the court may drift too far. If so it will
amount to a lack of candor, and “lack of candor, when discovered, reveals a
lack of integrity.”258 The remedy to avoid this pitfall is clear: “a judge must
ensure accuracy and honesty in research, facts, and analysis.”259 In our
common law tradition, a “court’s ability to develop case law finds legitimacy
only because the decision is accompanied by a publicly recorded statement of
reasoning available to all future readers.”260 Future opinions will reveal the
extent of the drift toward forced formalism.
CONCLUSION
A critical review of recent important Federal Circuit decisions reveals that
the court is writing in a decisional formalistic manner, while behind the writing
is a decisional instrumentalist methodology. The style results in a minimal
discussion of policy and a hyper-construction of precedent. If this trend
continues, it will lead to increasingly problematic results. In the short term, it
increases uncertainty as precedent is obscured and policy is under-analyzed. If
carried further, it would lead court observers to confusion and/or cynicism.
Carried to the extreme, it would culminate in a lack of judicial candor and
harm the Federal Circuit’s legitimacy. Of course, the worst of these results are
not inevitable. Continued scrutiny of the Federal Circuit’s opinions will allow
commentators to gauge the court’s trajectory and to evaluate the effects of that
trajectory.

257. Lebovits et al., supra note 245, at 242 (quoting Mortimer Levitan, Professional TradeSecrets: What Illusions Should Lawyers Cultivate?, 43 A.B.A. J. 628, 666 (1957)).
258. Id. at 293 (citing David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV.
731, 741 (1987)); see also Nard & Duffy, supra note 230, at 1654–55.
259. Lebovits et al., supra note 245, at 238.
260. Aldisert et al., supra note 244, at 5.
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